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Abstract. In this paper we examine the redesign of LOKI, LOKI 91
proposed in [5]. First it is shown that there is no characteristic with a
probability high enough to do a successful dierential attack on LOKI 91.
Secondly we show that the size of the image of the F-function in LOKI 91
is 8
13
 232. Finally we introduce a chosen plaintext attack that reduces
an exhaustive key search on LOKI 91 by almost a factor 4 using 233 + 2
chosen plaintexts.
1 Introduction
In 1990 Brown et al [4] proposed a new encryption primitive, called LOKI,
later renamed LOKI 89, as an alternative to the Data Encryption Standard
(DES), with which it is interface compatible. Cryptanalysis showed weaknesses
in LOKI 89 [2, 5, 8] and a redesign, LOKI 91 was proposed in [5]. The ciphers
from the LOKI family are DES-like iterated block ciphers based on iterating a
function, called the F-function, sixteen times. The block and key size is 64 bits.
Each iteration is called a round. The input to each round is divided into two
halves. The right half is fed into the F-function together with a 32 bit round key
derived from the keyschedule algorithm. The output of the F-function is added
(modulo 2) to the left half of the input and the two halves are interchanged
except for the last round. The LOKI ciphers run 16 rounds. The plaintext is the
input to the rst round and the ciphertext is the output of the last round. The
input to the F-function is the xor'ed value of a 32 bit input text and a 32 bit
round key. The 32 bits are expanded to 48 bits and divided into blocks of 12
bits. The 12 bit blocks are the inputs to the 4 S-boxes in LOKI 91, each of which
produces an 8 bit output. The 32 bits are permuted making the output of the
F-function.
In section 2 we do dierential cryptanalysis of LOKI 91 and show that there is
no characteristic with a probability high enough to do a successful dierential
attack. Dierential cryptanalysis was introduced by Biham and Shamir [1]. The
underlying theory was later described by Lai and Massey [6]. For the remainder
of this paper we expect the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of dif-
ferential cryptanalysis. Please consult the papers [1, 3, 6] for further details.
In section 3 we examine the size of the image of the F-function, the round func-
tion in LOKI 91. Because the key is added to the input text before the expansion
in the F-function, the inputs to the 4 S-boxes are dependent. We show that this
has the eect that the size of the image of the F-function is 8
13
 232.
In section 4 we show a weakness in the keyschedule of LOKI 91, i.e. that for every
key K there exists a key K, such that K and K have 14 common round keys.
We exploit this weakness in a chosen plaintext attack that reduces an exhaustive
key search by almost a factor 4 using 233 + 2 chosen plaintexts.
2 Dierential cryptanalysis of LOKI 91
In [5] it is indicated that LOKI 91 is resistant against dierential cryptanalysis,
a chosen plaintext attack introduced in [1]. The rst thing to do in dierential
cryptanalysis is to look for good characteristics or dierentials. In [3] Biham and
Shamir introduced an improved dierential attack on DES. The attack shows
how to extend an r-round characteristic to an (r+1)-round characteristic with
unchanged probability by picking the chosen plaintexts more carefully. The cost
is a more complex analysis. The improvement can be obtained in attacks on any
DES-like iterated cipher. Thus the existence of a 13-round characteristic with
a too high probability might enable a successful dierential attack on LOKI 91.
The probability of an r-round characteristic is found by multiplying the prob-
abilities of r 1-round characteristics. As stated in [6] this way of calculating
the probabilities for characteristics requires the cipher to be a Markov cipher.
Since the round keys are dependent, LOKI 91 is not a Markov cipher, however
tests for LOKI 89 show that the probabilities hold in practice at least for small
characteristics [8]. Furthermore we have found no way of incorporating the key
dependencies in the calculation of longer characteristics.
2.1 Characteristics for LOKI 91
The best one-round characteristic in LOKI 91 has probability 1 and comes from
the fact that equal inputs always lead to equal outputs. A round with equal
inputs is called a zero round (since the xor-sum of the inputs is zero).
The pairs xor table (see [1]) for LOKI 91 is a table with 220 entries. Table 1
shows the most likely combinations for input/outputxors for one S-box isolated.
Note that although inputxor 004x leads to outputxor 01x with probability
132
4096
for one S-box it doesn't mean we can nd a one round characteristic with this
probability. Because the key is added to the input text before the E-expansion
in LOKI 91 the inputs to two neighbouring S-boxes are dependent. In the above
case a neighbouring S-box will have inputxor 4ijx, where i; j 2 f0; :::; 15g.
The best one-round characteristic with a nonzero input dierence has probabil-
ity 52
4096
' 2 6:29. Therefore to nd a 13-round characteristic with a probability
high enough to enable a successful dierential attack some of the 13 rounds must
be zero rounds. The best characteristic for an attack on DES is based on a 2-
round iterative characteristic [1], where every second round is a zero round. The
best characteristic for an attack on LOKI 89 is based on a 3-round iterative
characteristic [5, 8], where every third round is a zero round. We need a few
denitions:
Input Output Prob. (n/4096) Input Output Prob. (n/4096)
4 1 132 c 1 76
80 4 52 a0 e8 46
173 f7 46 185 90 46
37b cd 48 3e0 24 48
42a 41 46 498 cf 56
49e 97 46 790 46 50
a20 0 46 a21 d7 48
c43 76 46 c76 f0 48
deb c9 46 e7b 5f 48
ea6 5d 46 eec ab 46
f33 e9 46
Table 1. The most likely combinations from the pairs xor table.
Denition 1 If the rounds no. (i   1) and (i + 1) are zero-rounds, round no.
(i) is of type A.
If the rounds no. (i   1) and (i+ 2) are zero-rounds, rounds no. (i) and (i + 1)
are a pair of type B.
If the rounds no. (i 1) and (i+3) are zero-rounds and the rounds no. (i), (i+1)
and (i + 2) are nonzero rounds, then rounds no. (i), (i + 1) and (i + 2) are a
triple of type C.
A round of type A must have the following form  ! 0x. The best probability
of such a round for LOKI 91 is 122
220
' 2 13 [5].
A pair of rounds of type B must have the following forms,
round no. (i): !  
round no. (i + 1):  !  [9]
Lemma 1 The highest probability for a pair of rounds of type B is ( 16
212
)2 = 2 16.
Proof: Consider the case where  and  dier in the input to only one S-box
each, Si and Sj respectively. Because of the P-permutation (see [4]) it follows
easily that the input/outputxor combinations for Si and Sj must have one of
the following four forms:






The highest probability for a pair of type B is therefore when the combination
in both  and  is 040x! 20x. It is exactly the situation that occurs for xpoints
[8]. From the pairs xor table it follows easily that if  and  dier in the inputs
to more than 2 S-boxes totally, we obtain probabilities smaller than 2 16. 2
A triple of rounds of type C must have the following forms,
round (i): ! 
round (i + 1):  !   
round (i + 2):  !  [9]
Lemma 2 The probability for a triple of rounds of type C is at most 2 22.
Proof: By a similar argument as for type B, assume that ;  and  dier in the
inputs to only one S-box each. Obviously  and  must dier in the inputs to the
same S-box. It means that the combination in round (i+1) must have one of the
forms from Table 2. The combination in both round (i) and (i+2) must have the
following form: 0Y 0x ! Z, where Z 2 f2x; 8x; 20x; 80xg and Y 2 f0x; ::::::::; fxg.






probability of a triple of type C has probability at most
34  16  28
236
< 2 22:
Note that  6=  otherwise  would have to dier in the inputs to at least two
neighbouring S-boxes [5]. 2
Now we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 There is no 13-round characteristic for LOKI 91 with probability
higher than 2 63.
Proof: The best one-round characteristic with a nonzero input dierence has
probability 52
4096
' 2 6:29. Because ( 52
4096
)n > 2 63 ) n  10, we must have
at least 3 rounds with equal inputs in the 13-round characteristic (13R). Since
two consecutive zero-rounds force all rounds to be zero-rounds we can have at
most 7 zero-rounds.
7 zero-rounds: Every second round is of type A, therefore
P (13R)  (2 13)6 = 2 78
6 zero-rounds: At least 3 rounds are of type A, the remaining 6 rounds can have
probability at most 2 6:29, therefore
P (13R)  (2 13)3  (2 6:29)4 = 2 64:2
5 zero-rounds: There can be at most one round of type A, since
(2 13)n  (2 6:29)8 n > 2 63 ) n  1
There are two cases to consider
1. No rounds of type A, thereby 4 pairs of type B:
P (13R)  (2 16)4 = 2 64
2. One round of type A, thereby at least 2 pairs of type B:
P (13R)  2 13  (2 16)2  (2 6:29)3 = 2 63:9
4 zero-rounds: There can be no rounds of type A, since
(2 13)n  (2 6:29)9 n > 2 63) n < 1
There can be at most one pair of type B, since
(2 16)n  (2 6:29)9 2n > 2 63) n  1
There are two cases to consider
1. No pairs of type B, thereby 3 triples of type C:
P (13R)  (2 22)3 = 2 66
2. One pair of type B, thereby at least one triple of type C:
P (13R)  2 16  2 22  (2 6:29)4 = 2 63:2
3 zero-rounds: All 10 nonzero rounds must be based on the best combination
080x ! 4x, since the second best combination has probability 2
 6:47 and
(2 6:29)9  2 6:47 < 2 63. However it is not possible to construct a 13-round
characteristic based solely on the best combination. 2
The above does not prove that LOKI 91 is resistant against dierential attacks.
As stated in [7] to prove this resistance for a DES-like cipher we need to nd
the best possible dierentials. However this seems to be extremely dicult for
LOKI 91 and we have done no work in that direction.
3 The F-function of LOKI 91
In the redesign of LOKI89 [5] one of the guidelines was
{ to ensure that there is no way to make all S-boxes give 0 outputs, to increase
the ciphers security when used in hashing modes.
The 4 S-boxes in LOKI 91 are equal. Each S-box takes a 12 bit input and pro-
duces an 8 bit output. Each output value occurs exactly 16 times. The inputs
to one S-box that result in a 0 output are listed in Table 1. Because the key
is added to the input text before the E-expansion, the input to one S-box is
dependent on the inputs to neighbouring S-boxes. Let the input to one S-box be
hijx, then the input to one of the neighbouring S-boxes is jklx. From Table 1
we see that to get 0 output from both S-boxes we must have h; j 2 f0; 5; a; c; fg
and j; l 2 f3; 4; 9; eg leaving no possible values for j. Therefore we cannot get 0
4 49 8e d3 514 559 59e 5e3
a24 a69 aae af3 c03 f34 f79 fbe
Table 3. Inputs yielding 0 output for one S-box (hex notation)
outputs from any two neighbouring S-boxes. Let the output from the F-function
be B = fb1; b2; b3; b4g where bi represents the output byte from S-box i. Then
B = f0; 0; ; g, B = f; 0; 0; g, B = f; ; 0; 0g and B = f0; ; ; 0g, where ''
represents any byte value, are impossible values in the image of the F-function.
We found a lot of other impossible values. Therefore we made an exhaustive
search for the size of the image of the F-function in LOKI 91.
Theorem 2 The F-function is not surjective, indeed the size of the image of F
is about 231:3:
Note that once we found that B = fb1; b2; b3; b4g, where bi represents the output
byte from S-box i, is not in the image of F, then because the 4 S-boxes in LOKI 91
are equal we know that any rotation of the four bytes yields a value not in the
image of F. The exact number of impossible values is 1; 638; 383; 180' 5
13
232.
It means that about 5 out of 13 values are never hit in the output of the F-
function. In DES we do not have that the inputs to the S-boxes are dependent,
because the key is added after the E-expansion. Therefore the size of the image
of the F-function in DES is 232. We have not found any ways to exploit the
above observation in an attack on LOKI 91. A consequence of the observation is
that the left and right halves of a ciphertext reveals 0.7 bit of information about
the inputs (before addition of the keys ) to the second last round respectively
the third last round of the encryption.
4 A chosen plaintext attack reducing key search
We begin by giving the notation used in this section.
Notation:
{ X is the bitwise complement of X.
{ Roln(X) is bitwise rotation of X n positions to the left.
{ E16(P;K) is a full 16 round encryption of P using K.
{ E2(P;K
0) is a 2 round encryption of P using the 32 bit key K0 in the rst
round and Rol13(K
0) in the second round.
{ Swap(X;Y ) is the swapping of X and Y .
{ Swap(Z) is the swapping of the left and right halves of Z.
{ XkY is the concatenation of X and Y .
The attack we are to describe makes use of a property of the key schedule in
LOKI 91. The key size is 64 bits. The key is divided into two 32 bit halves KL,
KR and the 16 round keys K(i); i = 1; :::; 16, are derived as follows:
1. i := 1
2. K(i) = KL ; i = i + 1
3. KL = Rol13(KL)
4. K(i) = KL ; i = i + 1
5. KL = Rol12(KL)
6. Swap(KL;KR)
7. go to 2.
The key schedule allows two dierent keys to have several round keys in common.
Theorem 3 For every key K there exists a key K*, such that K and K* have
14 round keys in common.
Proof: Let K(1); :::::;K(16) be the roundkeys for K = KLkKR. Let K
 =
KRkRol25(KL). Then K(2 + i) = K
(i); i = 1; ::; 14. 2
If K = K Theorem 3 is trivial, but this happens for only two keys, because
K = K ) (KL = KR) ^ (KR = Rol25(KL)) ) KR = KL = Rol25(KL) )
K = 00::::00_K = 11::::11, since gcd(25; 32) = 1:
Corollary 1 There exists 236 pairs of keys, K and K*, such that K and K* have
16 round keys in common.
Let K = KLkKR, KL = hh:::hhx for some hex digit h and let KR be any 32
bits. From Theorem 3 we have a key K such that K and K have 14 round
keys in common and we have furthermore K(15) = Rol100(KL) = KL = K(1)
and K(16) = Rol113(KL) = Rol13(KL) = K(2), i.e. K and K
 have 16 round
keys in common. 2
Theorem 3 can be used in a chosen plaintext attack to reduce an exhaustive key
search by almost a factor 2. It is well known that the complementation property1
of DES can be used to reduce an exhaustive key search of DES by a factor 2 in
an attack that needs two chosen plaintexts [1]. The complementation property
holds also for LOKI 91. This property and Theorem 3 can be used to reduce
an exhaustive key search by almost a factor 4 in a chosen plaintext attack that
needs 233 + 2 plaintexts.
Algorithm:
1. Pick P = PLkPR at random. Get encryptions C; C
 for P; P .
2. For all a 2 f0; 1; :::; (232  1)g:
Let P (a) be E2(P; a). More precisely P (a) = PL(a)kPR(a), where
PL(a) = F (PR; a) PL
PR(a) = F (PL(a); Rol13(a))  PR:
3. Get encryptions C(a); C(a) for P (a); P (a) for all a.
4. Let all keys be non discarded.
1 Let C be the encryption of P using K, then C is the encryption of P using K as the
key.
5. Exhaustive search for key:
For every non discarded key K = KLkKR, do
(a) Find C0 = E16(P;K)
(b) then
{ if C0 = C return K and stop
{ if C0 = C

return K and stop
{ if E2(Swap(C
0); Rol100(KL)) = C(KL)
return (KRkRol25(KL)) and stop
{ if E2(Swap(C
0); Rol100(KL)) = C(KL)
return (KRkRol25(KL)) and stop
(c) Discard the four keys in (b).
Upon termination we have found either the secret key or a collision for LOKI 91,
i.e. K 6= K, such that E16(P;K) = E16(P;K
). Note that in step 5, once we
have encrypted P using key K = KLkKR without success, we do not have to
encrypt P using neither K, (KRkRol25(KL)) nor (KRkRol25(KL)). If one of
these three keys is the secret key, then the algorithm would have terminated
before. At some points in the algorithm some of the four keys in 5(b) are equal,
for example the all zero key will appear twice in the same iteration of step 5.
Therefore we cannot nd an enumeration of the keys in step 5, s.t. the total
no. of iterations of step 5 is exactly one quarter of the size of the key space, i.e.
262. There exists however an enumeration, s.t. the no. of iterations of step 5 is
about 262 + 248. It is given in Section 4.1 in every glory detail. Table 4 shows
the estimates for space, time and number of chosen plaintexts for the attack,
where one time unit is a full 16 round encryption and one space unit is 64 bits.
The estimate for Time is the number of encryptions made in the analysis. In
Estimates for Time Space Chosen plaintexts
1:07 262 233 + 2 233 + 2
Table 4. Complexity of the chosen plaintext attack
every iteration of step 5 we do one full 16-round encryption in 5(a). For the
two last tests in step 5(b) we do at most 2 rounds of encryption. For most
iterations however, we need only to do one round of encryption, because we can
test for equality of the right halves of E2(Swap(C
0); Rol100(KL)) and C(KL)
(resp. C(KL)) already after one round of encryption of Swap(C
0). If the tests
fail we need not do the second round of encryption. Therefore for only about
one out of 231 iterations we need to do two rounds of encryption in 5(b). The
total amount of time therefore is










Compared to this the time used in step 2 is negligible. The above attack is a
weak attack. First of all, it is not very likely that we can get the encryptions
for 233 + 2 chosen plaintexts, furthermore an exhaustive search for 262 keys is
computationally infeasible. The LOKI cipher is meant as an alternative to DES,
with which it is interface compatible. The so far best known attack on DES was
introduced by Biham and Shamir in [3]. The attack is a chosen plaintext attack
that needs 247 chosen plaintexts. The time used in the analysis phase is 237.
The time needed for the above attack on LOKI 91 is signicantly higher than for
Biham and Shamirs attack on DES, however the requirements for ever getting
to the analysis phase, i.e. the number of encryptions of chosen plaintexts needed,
are much higher for the attack on DES.
The steps 2, 3 and 5 can be carried out in parallel, for instance by lettingKL = a
in step 5, in that way we don't have to store the 232 C(a); C(a)'s in step 3.
It seems impossible however to obtain an enumeration that at the same time
makes the total no. of iterations of step 5 be close to 262 and enables a parallel
run of the algorithm.
4.1 Enumeration of the keys in the chosen plaintext attack
We use the same notation as in the previous Sect. Let A be a function from
GF (2)64 to itself
A : KLkKR ! KRkRol25(KL)
As stated above, once we have tried the key K = KLkKR in step 5 of the
algorithm without success, we don't have to try the keys
A(K); K; A(K)
The idea is to use A to construct a set of keys about half the size of the key
space and s.t.
{ the biggest block of bits in every key consists of 1's.
{ for every key K, A(K) is also in the set.
Then let the enumeration of the keys be every second key from the above con-
structed set of keys. Later in this Sect. we show that the enumeration obtained
this way makes the total no. of keys tried in the attack be very close to 262.
Let Alist(K) be the set of 64 keys fK;A(K);A2(K); ::::::::;A63(K)g. Note that
A64(K) = K. Dene for K = KLkKR
MK = [p;qfAlist(Rolp(KL)kRolq(KR)) [Alist(Rolp(KR)kRolq(KL))g
for p = 0; 1; 2; 3 and q = 0; 8; 16; 24.
Lemma 3 For K = KLkKR, MK is the set of all keys of the forms:
Rolx(KL)kRoly(KR)
Rolx(KR)kRoly(KL)
for all x; y 2 f0; 1; :::::;31g
Proof: For xed K there are 23232 = 211 keys of the above form. Since Alist
produces 64 keys, the total no. of keys inMK is 2 16 64 = 2
11. Therefore it
suces to show that the pairs of rotations of the keys in MK are distinct, i.e.
that Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) does not appear twice for any a; b. It is obvious that
Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) does not appear twice in one Alist. There are two cases to
consider, Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) appears in
1. Alist(Rolp(KL)kRolq(KR)) and Alist(Rolp0 (KL)kRolq0 (KR))
Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) = Rolp+25n(KL)kRolq+25n(KR) ^
Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) = Rolp0+25n(KL)kRolq0+25n(KR) )
p+ 25n = p0 + 25nmod 32 ^ q + 25n = q0 + 25nmod 32 )
p  p0 = q   q0mod 32 ) (p; q) = (p0; q0);
since p  p0 2 f 3; 2; 1; 0; 1;2;3g and q   q0 2 f0; 8; 16; 24g.
2. Alist(Rolp(KL)kRolq(KR)) and Alist(Rolp0 (KR)kRolq0(KL))
Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) = Rolp+25n(KL)kRolq+25n(KR) ^
Rola(KL)kRolb(KR) = Rolq0+25n(KL)kRolp0+25+25n(KR) )
p+ 25n = q0 + 25nmod 32 ^ q + 25n = p0 + 25 + 25nmod 32 )
p+ p0 + 25 = q + q0mod 32
A contradiction, since p+p0+25 2 f25; 26; :::;31g and q+ q0 2 f0; 8; 16; 24g.
2
Let Ka and Kb be two 32-bit keyhalves, s.t. Ka and Kb are no rotations of
each other, i.e. Rolx(Ka) 6= Kb for any x, 0 < x < 32. For K = KakKb,
MK is a set of distinct keys except in the cases where Rolx(Ka) = Ka and/or
Roly(Kb) = Kb.
Lemma 4 Let H be a 32-bit key and Roln(H) any rotation to the left of H,
where 0 < n < 32. Then there are 2gcd(n;2) possible values of H, such that
H = Roln(H).
From Lemma 4 it follows for K = KLkKR, where KL and KR are no rotations
of each other, that
Lemma 5 There at most 249 keys for which the elements in MK are not dis-
tinct.
Proof: Assume we have two equal keys K0 and K fromMK . Then
K0 = Rola(KL)kRolb(KR); K = Rolc(KL)kRold(KR)
Clearly from the proof of Lemma 1 (a; b) 6= (c; d). Then
Rola(KL) = Rolc(KL) ^Rolb(KR) = Rold(KR))
Rola c(KL) = KL ^Rolb d(KR) = KR
If a = c then there are 232 possible values for KL, but then there are at most
216 possible values for KR according to Lemma 4, since (a; b) 6= (c; d). If b = d
then a 6= b and we get a total no. of 2 232  216 = 249 keys. 2
The following algorithm makes a list of 32 bit strings, where no two strings are
rotations of each other and where the biggest block of bits in every string consists
of 1's.
ALGORITHM - No-rotations-of-keys (NRK)
















ai+nmod (k+1)  32
k i, for all n  k.
Method: For every k-tuple (a1; ::::::; ak) output the 32-bit key, where the a1 MSB
are 1-bits, the next a2 bits are 0-bits and so on.
Lemma 6 No two keys in the output from (NRK) are rotations of each other.
Proof: Because of the inequality in 3. above if k > 1, then k is even. Therefore
for k > 1 the ak LSB are 0-bits and furthermore a1  ai for i  k.
Let A and A0 be two 32 bit keys from (NRK), s.t. A = Rolx(A
0) for some xed x.





) according to the method
in (NRK). Clearly l = m otherwise A cannot be a rotation of A0. Because
A = Rolx(A




; 0 < n  m
Especially we have a1 = a
0
i





1 ^ a1  am i+2
Therefore a0
i
= a01 ) a1 = a
0






2 = am i+3 ) a
0
2 = a2
By induction we obtain A = A0 2
ALGORITHM - Enumeration (EN)
1. i = 1
2. Let KL be the i'th output from (NRK).
3. For j = 1 to i do
(a) Let KR be the j'th output from (NRK)
(b) For K = KLkKR output the rst and then every second key from all
Alists in MK
(c) For K = KLkKR do as in 3b
4. i = i+ 1, goto 1.
We are left to check whether the set
KS = [KifKi;A(Ki);Ki;A(Ki)g
where the Ki0s are the keys output from (EN), contains the entire keyspace.








such that the biggest









are 1's then they are both output from (NRK).




, say K(j), are the key considered
in step 3(b) of (EN). Let K(n), 0 < n  210 be all keys output in step 3(b) when
K = K(j). Then L = fK(n);A(K(n))g, 0 < n  210 are all rotations of the key
halves in K(j) according to Lemma 3. Therefore K 2 L 2 KS.




are 0's, then at some point either K(j) or K(l) are
the key considered in step 3(b). Let K(n) be as before, when K = K(j). Then
L = fK(n);A(K(n))g, 0 < n  210 are all rotations of the key halves in K(j)
according to Lemma 3. Therefore K 2 L 2 KS ) K 2 L 2 KS.




are 1's and 0's resp. or vice versa similar arguments
hold for step 3(c).
We have implemented (NRK) on a SUN-Sparc workstation. The number of key
halves output from (NRK) is 226+2068. It means that the number of keys output
from (NRK) in 2. and 3(a) above is about 251+237. Every second key fromMK
gives 210 keys for each K. The total number of keys in the enumeration therefore
is about
(251 + 237)  2 210 = 262 + 248:
We have given an enumeration of the keys, s.t. the total no. of iterations of step
5 in the algorithm of the chosen plaintext attack is close to 262. The time used
in the enumeration (EN) is negligible compared to the 1:07 262 full 16 rounds
of encryption of LOKI 91, since it runs only one time per every 2  210 runs of
step 5 in the algorithm of the chosen plaintext attack.
5 Conclusion and open problems
We have shown that we cannot nd a characteristic for LOKI 91 good enough to
do a successful dierential attack on LOKI 91. Still it is not enough to conclude
that LOKI 91 is secure against this kind of attack. To do that we need an ecient
way of calculating the probabilities of dierentials.
We have shown that the size of the image of the F-function in LOKI 91 is only
8
13
of the size of the image of the F-function in DES. We have found no way of
exploiting this fact in an attack on LOKI 91. Whether it represents a weakness
of the algorithm is left as an open question.
Finally we introduced a chosen plaintext attack on LOKI 91 that reduces an
exhaustive key search by almost a factor 4. The attack exploits a weakness in
the key schedule of LOKI 91. It might also be possible to use this weakness, the
common round key property, to nd collisions for LOKI 91 when used as a hash
function. This is left as an open question.
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